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Federal Rule of Evidence 407 Versus
Rhode Island's Rule 407:
Public Policy Versus Relevance
Vin Greene*
INTRODUCTION
English philosopher and physician, John Locke, once said: "I
have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of
their thoughts." The inherent truth behind this saying is that
actions are the empirical evidence of our thoughts, our knowledge,
and our realizations. In the world of products liability, it stands to
reason that a manufacturer's changes in product design,
implemented after that product has caused injury, manifest an
otherwise silent acknowledgment that something was inherently
defective with a product.
Despite the fact that remedial measures are often the "best
evidence" of a Defendant's negligence, in most jurisdictions, a
Plaintiff cannot introduce such evidence at trial for the purpose of
establishing liability. The realm of the courtroom is guarded by
rules designed to, among other things, illicit the truth of a matter
or issue. The rule governing admissibility of a manufacturer's
subsequent changes in its product does nothing of the kind.
* The author would like to thank the following people who have contributed
immeasurably to the drafting of this article: Ashley Hornstein, Ed Wallace,
Mark Miller, Donald Migliori, Leah Donaldson, Aileen Sprague, and Robert
McConnell. As always, thank you to my wife and daughter, for their support.
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Rather, the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in the
modern industrialized world shields Defendants, preventing their
actions, vis-h-vis their product design, from being evaluated by a
judge and jury to determine a Defendants' responsibility and fault.
Almost 150 years old in concept, the rule excluding evidence
of subsequent remedial measures was codified in Federal Rule of
Evidence 407.1 The rule states:
[w]hen, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously,
would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent remedial measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect
in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a
warning or instruction.
' 2
Interpreted simply, the rule bars the admission of evidence of
subsequent remedial actions when such evidence is offered for the
purpose of proving a party's conduct.
3
I. THE FEDERAL RULE: TIMING IS EVERYTHING
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible in general
negligence cases, as well as in strict liability cases for product
defects, design defects, and failures to warn.4  The 1997
amendment to the rule extended its reach to cover the realm of
product liability claims. 5 This amendment, in the context of mass
tort product liability matters, forces courts to make rulings on
evidentiary matters based solely upon the random timing of
injuries. This inequity occurs because the linchpin in the
application of Federal Rule 407 is the timing or date of the
Plaintiffs alleged injury.6 Thus, where identical, or substantially
1. See David Wadswoth, Forma Scientifi v. Biosera and the
Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict
Products Liability Actions, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 757, 760 (2000).
2. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
3. See Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1975); see
also Wadswoth, supra note 1.
4. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
5. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment.
6. See Figueroa v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2003 WL 21488012 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (citing Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 20-21 (4th Cir.
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similar, mass produced products cause thousands of injuries over
a span of years, a Plaintiffs access to evidence at trial may depend
solely on the point in time that his or her misfortune occurred
upon the continuum of a Defendant's remedial changes. The plain
text of the rule provides that:
[w]hen, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures that are taken that, if taken previously,
would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in the
product, a defect in the product's design, or a need for a
warning or instruction. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
7
Thus, by its clear and explicit terms, Federal Rule of Evidence
407 operates to exclude evidence of remedial measures only when
the actions are taken subsequent to the injury of the Plaintiff.
The 1997 addition of the words "injury or harm" to Rule 407
clarified that the "event" is, in fact, the accident or injury and not
the date of manufacture of the product. Yet, that clarification
does nothing more than specifically define the cutoff date upon
which a Plaintiffs ability to access and to use key liability
evidence in court. As the Federal District Court in Rhode Island
1988). In Figueroa, the court found that evidence of the voluntary recall of
vaginal sling by a manufacturer was admissible against the manufacturer in
a products liability lawsuit. In denying defendant's motion in limine seeking
to exclude evidence of post-sale conduct, the court held that although the
implantation of the medical device occurred prior to the recall, it was not a
subsequent remedial measure because the recall occurred four months before
discovery and diagnosis of vaginal erosion and five months before it was
removed: "Here, BSC's Rule 407 objection is overruled, for the recall occurred
four months before the discovery and diagnosis of Figueroa's vaginal erosion
and five months before the Sling was removed. I am not persuaded that the
Rule 407 'event' here is the implantation of the sling, just as the 'event' in
Chase, for example, was the accident, not the sale of the allegedly defective
vehicle. 856 F.2d at 21. Although some of the injury or harm to Figueroa
might have occurred prior to the recall, some of the injury and harm occurred
after as well. In any event, the injury was not evident until Figueroa began
to suffer vaginal bleeding in April 1999. Id. at *5.
7. FED. R. EVID. 407 (emphasis added).
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made clear, "all evidence... that occurred prior to the incident...
will be admitted. This evidence is not governed by Rule 407 and is
highly probative as to notice and knowledge.... "8 However,
"[ulnder 407... measures which take place after the 'event' are
excluded. The term 'event' refers to the accident that precipitated
the suit."9  In short, timing is everything. 10  For a "mass tort"
8. Rollins v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Ed., 761 F. Supp. 939, 940
(D.R.I. 1991). Five years later, the First Circuit reaffirmed this principle.
See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North Amer., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 481 (1st
Cir. 1996) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 407 ... does not apply where, as here,
the modification took place before the accident that precipitated the suit.").
One year later, the First Circuit re-affirmed this principle. See Moulton v.
Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 26 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997) ("This modification is not a
subsequent remedial measure for purposes of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. That rule does not apply where, as here, the modification
preceded the accident involved in the current lawsuit.); see also Trull v.
Volkswagen of Amer., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Although
evidence concerning subsequent remedial measures generally is not
admissible at trial, see FED.R.EVID. 407, measures that take place before the
accident at issue do not fall within the prohibition.").
9. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991).
See also Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.N.J. 1982)
(evidence properly excluded where defendant withdrew product from the
market approximately six months after the plaintiff sustained her injuries);
Buckman v. Bombadier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 553-54 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
(involving post-accident recall); Duchess v. Langston Corp., 769 A.2d 1131,
1132, 1145 (Pa. 2001) (excluding evidence of a post-accident design change);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984) (involving a
post-accident design change); Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 428 (3d Cir.
2004) (same); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1029
(7th Cir. 1982) (adoption of post-accident safety policy); Benedict v. Zimmer,
Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035-36 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (post-accident design
change); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980) (post-
accident warning); Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 270 n.10
(5th Cir. 2002) (post-accident changes to package insert); Gerber v. Hoffman-
La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 919 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (post-accident
warning in product insert).
10. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 531 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that Rule 407 does not apply to post-manufacture, pre-accident
measures); Ake v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 879 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(Rule 407 bars evidence of remedial measures taken after an injury or harm.
Rule 407 "does not apply to pre accident conduct."); Kelly v. Crown Equip.
Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3rd Cir. 1992); Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901
F.2d 42, 44 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) ("event," i.e., injury to plaintiff while assisting
in operation of crane, occurred after "the decision to standardize the anti-two
blocking device," and its implementation before accident); Laura B. Grubbs,
Something's Gotta Give: The Conflict Between Evidence Rule 407 and the
Feasible Alternative Design Requirement, 45 BRANDEIs L.J. 781, 785 (2006)
("Defendant's remedial measures taken prior to the injury or harm do not fall
2011] FRE 407 VERSUS RHODE ISLAND'S RULE 407 637
Plaintiff, the scope of trial will be defined not by the nature or
relevancy of the Defendant's conduct, but simply by the timing of
that conduct.'1 As a result, the rule leads to arbitrary and
capricious results based solely on the random timing of a
hypothetical Defendant's conduct versus a hypothetical Plaintiffs
injuries.
Take, for example, products liability cases involving
implantable medical devices. Imagine two patients, Mr. Smith
and Mr. Jones, both implanted on the same day with identical,
permanent medical devices. Unbeknownst to both patients, their
implants contain the same inherent design flaw, originating with
the manufacturer, which will result in the failure of both devices,
causing catastrophic injuries. The only distinction between our
hypothetical patients is the timing of the failure of these otherwise
identical devices: Mr. Smith's implant will fail within a year after
implantation, while Mr. Jones' implant will fail three years after
implantation.
During the years between the occurrence of Mr. Smith's and
Mr. Jones' injuries, the manufacturer undertakes a number of
remedial measures, including multiple product recalls, product
redesigns, changes to the product's warnings and instructions for
use, and worst case scenario testing. If both Mr. Smith and Mr.
Jones file complaints in the Federal District Court of Rhode
Island, and do so on the same day against the same Defendant
manufacturer, only Mr. Jones will be permitted to introduce
within the scope of the exclusion even if they occurred subsequent to the
design of the product.").
11. See Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 20-21 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding trial judge's use of Rule 407 to exclude evidence of a change in
brake design that occurred after manufacture and sale of allegedly defective
vehicle but before accident was improper); see also Cates v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 928 F.2d 679, 685-687 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding court erroneously
excluded warning placard to table saw as subsequent remedial measure
because Rule 407 applies only to post-accident measures); Roberts, 901 F.2d
at 44 (holding that a measure instituted post-manufacture, but pre-injury
was not covered under Rule 407, and was consequently admissible);
Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1980) (deciding trial
judge improperly utilized 407 to exclude evidence of change in position of gas
tank that occurred after manufacture of plaintiffs truck but before accident),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 (1981); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332,
1343 (5th Cir. 1978) (deciding written document created before the accident
was not a subsequent remedial measure).
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Defendant's remedial measures as evidence, as Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 excludes that evidence only when the actions are
taken subsequent to the injury of the Plaintiff. That is the
irrational inequity created by application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 in the world of modern, mass produced products. 12
12. The author recognizes that there are alternative grounds for
admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. Indeed, it is well known
and frequently noted that evidence of subsequent measures is allowed for
purposes other than to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in the
product, a defect in the product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. See Rollins v. Bd. Of Governors for Higher Ed., 761 F. Supp. 941
(D.R.I. 1991) ("This Court, however, makes a reservation in accord with Rule
407. Subsequent repairs, alterations, or procedural changes may be
admissible if offered to prove ownership, control or feasibility of
precautionary measure, if such is controverted. Moreover, defendants should
be on notice that such evidence may also be admitted if necessary for
impeachment purposes or if plaintiff seeks to admit the evidence for reasons
other than to demonstrate the defendants' culpability."). In fact, Rule 407
provides a non-exhaustive list of exceptions: "This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment." FED. R. EVID. 407. Because Rule
407 precedes the listed exceptions with the phrase "such as," the exceptions
are illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Thus, evidence of remedial measure
may be admissible as relevant to claims or defenses in addition to those listed
in the rule. Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, No. 94-1818, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16772 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1998), affd 295 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2002)
(evidence of subsequent remedial measure admissible to rebut assertion of
government contractor defense); Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp.,
706 F.2d 1060, 1066 (10th Cir. 1983) (allowing introduction of evidence of
remedial measures taken by a ski resort after an accident); Kenny v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978)
(holding evidence that new fluorescent fixture was installed soon after rape
attack properly admitted to counter defendant's inference that light was
adequate); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
407-31 to 407-33 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed. 2009); see also Werner v.
Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 407,
which enacts the common law rule excluding subsequent remedial measures
to prove negligence, does, however, permit evidence of subsequent remedial
measures to be used to prove the feasibility of such measures, but only if
feasibility is controverted by the defendant."); Doyle v. U.S., 441 F. Supp.
701, 709 n.4 (D.S.C. 1977). Rule 407 "cannot be used to exclude evidence
offered for 'another purpose,' one of which is 'feasibility of precautionary
measures,' if controverted." Raymond, 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 407); see also Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1985);
Wetherill v. Univ. of Chi., 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(interpreting F.R.E. 407 and recognizing that subsequent remedial measures
offered to prove "causation" are not subject to rule because "causation" is
distinct from 'liability"); accord McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 77 C 4174,
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FRE 407: HOW DID WE GET HERE?
In theory, the policy behind the rule is to promote responsible
behavior. The Federal rule is based on a common law concept that
a defendant's subsequent repairs are not necessarily an admission
of negligence, and that repairs should be encouraged to reduce the
possibility of further injuries. 13 The rule's policy-based origins are
rooted in the pre-industrial concept of negligence, and it is the
post-industrial concept of products liability that has stretched the
1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1981); Duchess v.
Langston Corp., 769 A.2d 1131, 1148-50 (Pa. 2001) (holding subsequent
remedial measures are admissible to prove the "feasibility of precautionary
measures" if "controverted."); Estate of Spinosa v. Int'l Harvester Co., 621
F.2d 1154, 1160 n.5 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting where defendant contested
feasibility of dual-brake design for pickup truck, trial judge admitted post-
accident evidence that design changed after subsequent model year); see
Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558, 1561 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In the present
case, Pitasi did not seek to introduce Stratton's subsequent remedial
measures in order to prove that Stratton was negligent. Rather Pitasi sought
... to rebut [Stratton's] defense that Pitasi was contributorily negligent
because the dangerous conditions on East Meadow were so obvious and
apparent that warning signs or ropes at the trail's side entrances were
unnecessary. Rule 407 clearly allows a plaintiff to introduce evidence of
remedial measures to rebut such assertions."). Finally, as noted above,
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 expressly permits the admission of subsequent
remedial measures for impeachment. See Stevens v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 594, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1996); Harrison v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724
F.2d 613, 622 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding the admission of evidence of a
product recall for the purposes of impeachment of the manufacturer's
assertion that it voluntarily withdrew the product where the issue in the case
that was hotly contested was whether the defendant had withdrawn the
product voluntarily and the court did not grant the defendant's limiting
instruction to consider the recall evidence for no purpose other than as an
illustration of the case's "background").
The author declines to address these exceptions in this Article in
order to streamline the analysis. Although these exceptions to the rule exist,
Defendant corporations continue to have a safety net under the Federal rule,
because at all times, a court will retain discretion to exclude the evidence.
More importantly, the existence of these exceptions provides a separate basis
for criticism of the rule. Simply, "[t]he Rule is riddled with exceptions, and
the underlying policy rationale for the Rule has been severely criticized."
Michael W. Blanton, Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in Strict
Products Liability Cases: The Evidence Weighs Against Automatic Exclusion,
65 UMKC L. REV. 49, 102-03 (1996).
13. See Thais L. Richardson, The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure That Does Not Fix The
Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (1996).
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rule beyond its breaking point. 14
At common law, the rationale underlying the rule was first
put forth in the 1892 United States Supreme Court case Columbia
& Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne.15 There, the United States
Supreme Court held that evidence of a subsequently added safety
feature to a pulley would not be admissible to show fault. 6 The
Court stated that not only did it find such evidence to be
irrelevant, confusing for the jury, and prejudicial to the defendant,
but also that, "taking... precautions against the future is not to
be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past," and
admitting such evidence would only be "an inducement for
continued negligence." 17
The common law enunciated in Columbia & Puget Sound R.R.
v. Hawthorne ultimately became codified in the Federal rules,
when it was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on January
2, 1975. The rule was constructed based on two common law
foundations: relevance and public policy, with the latter reaching
back to Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne.18 On the
issue of relevance, the advisory committee noted, as an example,
that a product manufacturer may change a product's design,
because it discovered a better design or because it wanted to
implement an idea that was conceived before an accident. 19 The
committee advanced, that in a situation such as this, evidence of a
subsequent remedial measure would neither address the
reasonableness of the actor's conduct nor the foreseeability of risk
at the time the conduct occurred, and thus courts should exclude
the evidence on the specific issue of fault because it is irrelevant. 20
While the concepts underpinning Federal Rule of Evidence
407 were taking shape to address evidentiary issues in negligence
actions, almost simultaneously, products liability law itself was
developing. While it is an area of law where liability falls upon
manufacturers and distributors of products established by the
existence of a defect in a product at the time of sale or
14. See Wadsworth, supra note 1, at 760.
15. 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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distribution, 2 1 early on, plaintiffs who brought claims based on
products liability theories were limited to claims of negligence and
warranty. Historically, actions based on strict liability arose from
a combination of factors which held manufacturers accountable for
their defective products. 2
2
To understand this concept clearly, it is important to look to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, specifically section 402(a) that
focused on products liability. 23  This section, drafted by Dean
Wade Prosser and Dean John W. Wade, stated that a
manufacturer could be subject to liability for harms caused by a
product if the product was sold "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."24 The focus
however, was on manufacturing defects. In essence, the
Restatement (Second) failed to shed light on what would be the
legal standard for a defect of design. 25 A manufacturer was not
subject to liability for failure to warn about a risk that was not
known or discoverable at the time the product was made. 26 Thus,
there was no objective standard given to allow juries to decide
what a good product was as opposed to a bad one... what was or
was not "unreasonably dangerous."
27
As products liability litigation evolved, courts struggled with
applying the Restatement (Second) to this newly recognized area
of liability. 28 Further, since 402(A) seemingly emphasized 'fault',
it stood in direct conflict to the policy foundation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 407. How was it possible to prove that something should
have been manufactured better to begin with, when potentially
the best evidence that better design or manufacturing process is
the corporation's own subsequent remedial measures, which were
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1(b)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (stating that product defect is judged at time of
sale or distribution); see also Richardson, supra note 13.
22. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement Third, Torts: Products
Liability: A Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 42
(2000).
23. Id. at 41.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 42.
26. Id. at 41-42.
27. Id. at 42.
28. Id.
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barred from being introduced for that exact purpose? The policy
may apply to the negligence of an everyday man who erects a
fence or fixes a broken stair after someone falls within his home;
29
however, the policy's application to a manufacturer of mass
produced items in the new products liability arena seemed, if
anything, contradictory. Thus, there appeared to be no support
for the evidentiary exception in the products liability setting.
30
In an apparent attempt to rectify this 'muddled state of
affairs,' Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was amended in 1997. 3'
The rule now provides that "[w]hen, after an injury or harm
allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken
previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect
in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction."
32
This amendment, which clarified the triggering "event," also
eliminated the distinction between negligence and strict liability,
sending a clear message that any "strict liability" exception to the
rule excluding subsequent remedial measures was never the
initial intention of either the Supreme Court or Congress.
33
Although making the rule applicable in the strict liability realm,
the amendment failed to account for distinctions and nuances
between negligence and strict liability principles the types of
evidence necessary to establish a cause of action under each
concept. 34
"In plain common sense terms... a product that has
something wrong with it - a bicycle that has a missing spoke, a
cosmetic that contains a glass, a drink that has something in it
that should not have been there" is negligence on the part of a
manufacturer. On the other hand, design liability "condemns an
entire product line.. ." in essence it deals with products that are
29. Id.
30. See Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 797 (R.I.
1988); see also Brian Fielding, Rhode Island's 407 Subsequent Remedial
Measure Exception: Why It Informs What Goes Around Comes Around in
Restatement (Second) & (Third) of Torts, and a Modest Proposal, 14 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 298, 312 (2009).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment.
32. FED. R. EVID. 407.
33. Fielding, supra note 30, at 315-16.
34. See Schwartz, supra, note 22, at 43.
2011] FRE 407 VERSUS RHODE ISLAND'S RULE 407 643
"mismanufactured, which represents a total failure in quality
control." In other words, something is wrong with the product
because it was defective to begin with. This is strict liability. The
two principles attach liability based on a different set of factual
circumstances. 35
Thus, although the Federal Rule was amended in order to
"alleviate" conflicts, the amendment focused on the wrong part of
the rule.36 The problem was not related to defining whether the
rule was applicable in negligence versus strict liability.37  The
problem was inherent in the rule, and the concept upon which it is
based.38 The exclusion based upon timing of injury, mandated by
an unsupported public policy, could not be logically justified,
regardless of the liability theory. 39 Yet, the rule's flaws become
especially apparent in strict liability actions involving mass
produced items. Again, how is a plaintiff to present a case to a
jury, claiming a design defect, when the most credible and
objective evidence indicating whether or not a product was
"unreasonably dangerous" from its creation was a manufacturer's
subsequent remedial repairs, repairs that "remedied" the inherent
fault?4
0
In a further twist, Congress ratified the 1997 amendment at
the same time that the American Law Institute (ALI) committee
drafted the Restatement (Third) of Torts.41 In an attempt to solve
the problems in applying the product liability law to these
complex lawsuits, the newly drafted Section 2(b) set forth a
"reasonable alternative design" (RAD) requirement. 42 This section
stated that a "design defect exists when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.., and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe.' 43  The Restatement advocates for the use of
35. Id.
36. See Wadsworth, supra note 1, at 770.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 43.
41. Id.
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(b)
(1998).
43. Id.
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subsequent measures in order to show fault. 44  The RAD
requirement is a burden that falls on the Plaintiff.
45
The application of RAD, sans Rule 407, would be logical and
workable. 46  For claims arising out of strict products liability,
proving that something could have been made better, and that it
was reasonable to have been done so at the time is a fair tool.
47
Further, in advancing the RAD requirement, "all evidence of
subsequent remedial measures" becomes sufficiently competent
and relevant enough to overcome speculative policy
considerations. 48  However, the ALI inadvertently promulgated
scholarly instruction that was anything but useful.49 While the
ALI grasped for a solution for handling product liability cases, the
federal advisory committee was erecting a fortress around all
subsequent remedial measures, which effectively left Plaintiffs
outside the fortress walls. 50 The exclusionary rule rewarded, or at
the very least failed to even consider punishment for certain
corporate misbehavior, and the logical hypocrisy between the RAD
requirement and Rule 407 ultimately "shifted accident costs to
consumers by either precluding their claims or making them
harder to establish ....
The committee relied on a social policy argument as a
substantive basis for the exclusionary rule, which they called "the
more impressive ground for exclusion." For under a "liberal
theory" of relevance, the first hinge alone would not support the
exclusion, because the "inference [of fault] is still a possible one." 52
The social policy argument is that evidence of subsequent
remedial repairs should be excluded because manufacturers will
be less likely to make safety improvements for fear that such
44. See Fielding, supra note 30, at 306.
45. Id. at 318 & n.92.
46. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 43-44.
47. Id.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; see also R.I. R. EVID.
407 advisory committee's note.
49. See Fielding, supra note 30, at 316.
50. Id.
51. See Wadsworth, supra note 36, at 765.
52. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also G. Michael
Fenner, Evidence Review: The Past Year in the Eight Circuit, Plus Daubert,
28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 619 (1995) ("Evidence need not be conclusive, or
even persuasive, to be relevant: it need only make something of consequence
to the action somewhat more or less likely.").
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changes will be used against them as proof of fault.
53
Initially, the policy and enactment of Federal Rule 407 was
adopted by twelve jurisdictions, including Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Guam.14 Thirty
four other states mirror the federal rule in regard to negligence
claims. 55 Two states, Connecticut and Missouri, permit evidence
to be used in strict liability claims. Two others, Maine and Texas,
similarly mirror the federal rule, but allow "Notification of Defect"
as an admissible exception to support a product liability claim.
56
Rhode Island, alone, of all the 50 states, permits evidence of
remedial measures under all circumstances. 5
7
III. THE RHODE ISLAND RULE: RELEVANCE RULES THE DAY
A. Why Rhode Island's Rule Based on Relevance Is Better
The Federal Rules, although suggestive, have no binding
power over the states.5 8 In contrast to almost every jurisdiction,
Rhode Island's rules of evidence provide specifically for the
admission of subsequent remedial measures as evidence of a
manufacturing and design defect. As a result, Rhode Island sails
virtually alone in a sea of forty-nine states whose rules mirror the
Federal counterpart, albeit to varying degrees.5 9 The other forty
nine states established equivalent or nearly equivalent rules that
prevent evidence of subsequent remedial measures from being
introduced into evidence in either negligence or product liability
claims. 60 In contrast, Rhode Island's Rule of Evidence 407 states:
"[w]hen, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is admissible."6 1 Thus, our
hypothetical plaintiffs, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, despite their
timing differences, have equal access to evidence at trial in Rhode
53. Id. at 1460.
54. Fielding, supra note 30, at 300.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 301.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 300.
59. Id. at 300-01.
60. Id.
61. R. I. R. EVID. 407.
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Island's Superior Court, based primarily upon the relevance of the
evidence.
Unlike the Federal rule, the linchpin under Rhode Island's
rule 407 is not timing but relevancy. The question of admissibility
is not directed at the timing of an action, but whether that action
can logically and reasonably be connected to a given Defendant's
negligence.6 2 Protection is afforded to a Defendant not based upon
the arbitrary chronology of injuries, but by the mandate that
Plaintiffs proffered evidence must comply with the requirements
of Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.63 Moreover,
Defendants who undertake remedial measures subsequent to an
event or injury are also afforded the added protection, as are all
parties, of Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 403.64 Thus, it should
not be assumed that any and all subsequent remedial measures of
every type are automatically admissible in Rhode Island simply
because Rhode Island chose not to follow the Federal Rule 407
pattern. 
65
62. See HON. JUDITH C. SAVAGE & STEPHEN M. PRIGNANO, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO EVIDENCE ON RHODE ISLAND §3.4.2 (2011) (Under the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence, subsequent remedial measures, which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, are admissible at trial.).
63. R.I. R. EVID. 401 ('Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."); R.I. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by the Constitution of Rhode Island, by Act of Congress, by the
General Laws of Rhode Island, by these rules, or by other rules applicable in
the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
64. See SAVAGE & PRIGNANO, supra note 62, at § 3.4.1. ("Nevertheless, as
with all evidence, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is also subject to
Rule 403's undue prejudice standard. Thus, in the 'rare cases where it would
be unfair or misleading to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude it."') (citing Brokaw v.
Davol, Inc., 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 146 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2008).
65. Id. at §3.4 Judicial Commentary ("Courts are cautious in admitting
evidence of subsequent remedial measures for purposes of establishing
antecedent negligence (or admitting that evidence for other limited purposes,
such as notice) because of the potential for such evidence to be misleading
and highly prejudicial. It is important that a party seeking to admit such
evidence be prepared, as a threshold matter, to show that the measures
taken subsequent to the event in question were designed to remediate or
correct the defect at issue and that such measure, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur. Even if that threshold is crossed,
Rule 403 still may bar admissibility.").
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B. The Public Policy On Which The Federal Rule Is Based Is Not
Sound
Rhode Island instituted a more workable and rational rule
based upon the logical connection, or lack thereof, of a given piece
of evidence to the actual facts in an individual case.66 It did so
because Rhode Island found the following proposed basis for the
rule to be flawed: that if subsequent remedial measures were
admitted into evidence, then product manufacturers would not
take such remedial action in the event of injuries, and thus,
products would continue to be made regardless of safety.67 Rhode
Island did not follow Federal Rule of Evidence 407due, in part, to
the absence of any evidence supporting the proposition.6 8 Toward
the beginning of the comments, the advisory committee explicitly
states that Rhode Island was aware that its proposed rule was a
complete departure from its federal counterpart. 69 The committee
explained that "the proposed rule is consistent with the modern
trend and the central notion of relevancy in the rules and is based
on a more realistic assessment of the policy considerations
underlying the current approach. 7 °
Rhode Island relied on Maine's "Modern Repair Rule" at the
time of the rule's enactment in 1987.71 Essentially, Rhode Island
found extremely persuasive Maine's view that "the 'public policy
behind the rule against admissibility was that it would deter
repairs. This rationale is unpersuasive today."' 72  The
66. R.I. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); see
SAVAGE & PRIGNANO, supra note 62, at 3.4.1 ("For example, evidence that a
defendant installed warning signs on the subject property approximately
seven years after the plaintiffs injury was not allowed because it failed to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 407 as an admissible subsequent remedial
measure.") (citing Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, 820 A.2d 929, 943
(R.I. 2003).
67. Fielding, supra note 30, at 302.
68. See id. at 309-10.
69. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note. The committee quoted
Morancy v. Hennessey, 52 A. 1021, 1023 (R.I. 1902).
70. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
71. Fielding, supra note 30, at 301.
72. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (quoting Adviser's Note
to Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a)).
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commentary to Rhode Island's Rule 407, while criticizing and
rejecting the rationale underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 407,
notes that while "[r]ule 407 departs from current Rhode Island
law and Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in making evidence of
subsequent remedial measures admissible... [t]he proposed
Rhode Island rule is based on Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a). 73
In that regard, the authors relied on similar criticism levied by the
commentators in Maine at the policy by underling Federal Rule of
Evidence 407, which provided that "[w]hen after an event,
measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of subsequent measures is
admissible." 74 The Maine commentators noted that while "the
rule contradicts Maine law75 ... [p]ublic policy behind the rule
against admissibility was that it would deter repairs. This
rationale is unpersuasive today. In some instances subsequent
repairs may be evidence of culpability."76 "[I]t is doubtful that the
traditional rule affects primary behavior in either case where the
defendant is a large manufacturer or that the individual
defendant even knows about the rule. In the rare case where it
would be unfair or misleading to admit evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to
exclude it."' 7
7
Simply, "[t]he public policy concern behind [Federal Rule of
Evidence] Rule 407 has been subject to a great deal of criticism
due to a lack of evidence that manufacturers would avoid
correcting a defect and expose the public to further injuries if
subsequent remedial measures could be used against them in a
pending lawsuit."78 "It is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that
[the] producer will forego making improvements in its product,
and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and the attendant
adverse effects upon its public image, simply because evidence
of... such improvement may be admitted in an action founded on
strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the
73. ERIC D. GREEN & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, RHODE ISLAND EVIDENCE
MANUAL §407.02, at 134-36 (2005 ed.).
74. MAINE R. EVID. 407(a).
75. MAINE R. EVID. 407(a) (advisor's note).
76. Id.
77. GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 73, at 136.
78. Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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improvement., 79 No studies have been conducted that support
this policy proposition. In fact, empirical studies show quite the
opposite.80 As one commentator noted, "[t]hroughout the rather
long and tortuous history of the rule excluding repairs, no court or
writer has produced any empirical data showing that the rule has
resulted in a single repair or that its absence would discourage
repair activity."' 8
1
Stated more clearly, the policy underlying Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 is logically indefensible in the competitive world of
products manufacturing, which mandates improvement and
innovation, not only to remain stable, but also competitive.
8 2
Many other states have concurred in this assessment.83 "[I]t is
not reasonable to assume that manufacturers will forego
improvements in products in order to avoid admission of the
evidence of the improvements against them ... .
84
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the
normal products liability defendant, manufactures tens of
thousands of units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to
suggest that such a producer will forego making
improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon
its public image, simply because evidence of adoption of
such improvement may be admitted in an action founded
on strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded
the improvement. In the products liability area, the
exclusionary rule ... serves merely as a shield against
79. Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1975).
80. Fielding, supra note 30, at 309-10.
81. Victor E. Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs -
A Rule in Need of Repair, 7 FoRUM 1, 6 (1971).
82. Fielding, supra note 30, at 312.
83. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Jeep Corp. v.
Murray, 708 P.2d 297 (Nev. 1985); Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc., 328 N.W.2d
847 (S.D. 1982); Chart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680 (Wis. 1977);
Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982).
84. Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 527 (8th Cir. 1977). 2 STEPHEN
SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 407.02[2] at 407-4
(9th ed. 2006) ("We believe that the articulated social policy does not justify
the Rule."); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 78, at § 5282 ("[Iun view of the
devastating criticisms that have been made of this rationale, it is difficult to
see how anyone favoring the preservation of the rule could regard it as a
sound justification.").
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potential liability.
85
In fact, logic in the modern world dictates the opposite
conclusion. It is clear that "[e]conomic self-interest drives
reasonable improvement, not an unnecessary liability shield
derivative of a rule that excludes 'evidence for policy reasons quite
apart from enabling the trier of fact to reach a correct verdict."'
86
There is a strong and reasonable expectation that "in spite of
man's inherent flaws, with time the world should and must grow
wiser."87 If anything, "the dubious presence of potential liability,
keeps products manufacturers constantly aware" that if an injury
does occur, and no remedial measure is taken, the presumption of
negligence is heightened.88 Because there is sufficient incentive
for companies to continue to make repairsfollowing an accident, it
seems that the exclusionary rule "serves only to protect
defendants who might otherwise be held liable under substantive
tort principles ... without any corresponding benefit to society."
8 9
Ahead of its time, Rhode Island made the determination in
advance of its peers that Section 402(A) clearly set no boundaries
between strict liability and negligence for purposes of determining
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures.90 Recognizing the
importance of a consistent and reliable foundation for the
application of the law, Rhode Island avoids the inherent conflict
that has already begun to overshadow every other jurisdiction and
the federal court system once the RAD requirement "intersects
with federal rule 407. '' 91 Rhode Island has the better rule because
it avoided what other jurisdictions did not in this regard,
"inconsistent interpretations, split circuits, an invitation to forum
shopping due to lack of uniformity, and a general hodgepodge of
confusion."9
2
85. Fielding, supra note 30, at 312.
86. Id. at 313 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 81, at 3).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Schwartz, supra note 81, at 7.
90. Fielding, supra note 30, at 310-11.
91. Id. at 311.
92. Id. at 315.
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IV. THE DAVOL STORY: A CASE STUDY IN REALITY
So how does this affect our hypothetical plaintiffs, Mr. Smith
and Mr. Jones? Well, let us bring them into the real world. We
will implant them on different dates with ringed polypropylene
hernia patches, and multiply them by 1500, resulting in
approximately 3000 lawsuits with injuries occurring over a span
of years. This is the real world case study playing out today in
both the Federal District Court of Rhode Island and Rhode
Island's Superior Court. In both venues, there are approximately
1500 cases pending against Defendants, Davol, Inc., and its parent
company, C.R. Bard, who designed and manufactured the ringed
polypropylene hernia patches. The question is: did Rhode Island's
unique evidentiary rule inhibit Davol from undertaking any
remedial measures?
A. Davol
Davol focuses its business on products in key surgical
specialties, including hernia repair, hemostasis, orthopedics, and
laparoscopy. More specifically, Davol designed the Composix®
Kugel Mesh Patches (CK Patch) in approximately 2001. Davol
submitted a 510k Application to the Federal Drug Administration
on January 22, 2001. Following this 510k Application, the CK
Patch was authorized by the FDA as a Class II medical device.
Davol began manufacturing and distributing the CK Patch in
approximately 2001. Immediately after the CK Patches were
placed on the market, Davol began receiving actual notices of
memory ring failures and CK Patch defects. Knowing those CK
Patches were defective, dangerous and already placed on the
market, Defendants Davol conducted physician screenings and
reviews as early as 2002. An Establishment Inspection Report
(EIR) conducted by the FDA in 2006 found that the post market
survey validation process of the device was incomplete and failed
to include all the data from the physicians surveyed during this
time.
As early as September 2004, Defendants uncovered serious
problems with the weld process involving the memory recoil ring.
Despite attempts to correct the problem at the plant, Davol found
the corrective measures to be ineffective and the process still not
in control. Davol was aware these weld issues had existed from
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the time the CK Patches were originally placed on the market and
that all current lots suffered from this dangerous defect. On
August 30, 2005, Davol initiated a partial CK Patch distribution
hold. On December 22, 2005, Davol recalled many sizes of CK
Patches under a Class I recall notice. The CK Patch was recalled
due to a faulty "memory recoil ring" that can break under
pressure. On March 24, 2006, the initial Class I recall on the CK
Patch was expanded to include several more sizes of the patch and
numerous additional lots of the defective hernia mesh product.
On January 10, 2007, the existing recall on the CK Patch was
again expanded to encompass further production lots of the
defective hernia mesh product.
B. Davol's Remedial Measures
In cases currently in suit in the Federal District Court of
Rhode Island, because Federal Rule of Evidence 407 applies, the
availability of evidence for Plaintiffs has been dictated not by the
relevance of that evidence, but by the random timing of the
failures of their hernia patches. 93 Conversely, in cases in suit in
the Rhode Island Superior Court, where the Rhode Island rule
governs, Plaintiffs may seek to admit the evidence of Davol's
subsequent remedial measures at trial, as long as the court deems
that evidence to be relevant and not unduly prejudicial.
This fact pattern is instructive of the fallacy of the policy
underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and the copycat state 407
rules. Davol is incorporated under the laws of the State of Rhode
Island. It has its principal place of business in the State of Rhode
Island. In fact, it has been a Rhode Island corporate citizen for
more than 100 years. Davol makes its home where Rhode Island
Rule of Evidence 407 - permitting admission of evidence of
remedial measures - is the law of the land.94 Yet, throughout the
93. See Transcript of Pre-trial hearing at 5:10-15, Whitield v. Davol, CA
No. 1:07-cv-01918-ML-LDA, hearing (May 25, 2010) ("And so with respect to
the first three items, that is, the recalls, changes to the product design,
revisions to warnings or instructions for use, so long as they relate to pre-
explanation, those I think are relevant. Anything after Mr. Whitfield's patch
was removed I think is not relevant to this case.").
94. GREEN & FLANDERS, supra note 73; see also Moe v. Avions Marcel
Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It is our view
that when state courts have interpreted Rule 407 or its equivalent state
counterpart, the question of whether subsequent remedial measures are
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life of the CK product line, Davol undertook remedial measures.
It undertook ring weld enhancements; engaged in a Class I recall,
which it expanded twice; redesigned the product on 2006;
undertook internal and external audits; altered its complaint
handling, design input, design validation, and design verification
procedures and revised its instructions for use. The decisions
surrounding the design, manufacture, and sale of the Composix
Kugel line were made in Rhode Island. Likewise, the decisions
concerning remedial measures at issue were at all times made, in
whole or in part, in Rhode Island. All remedial measure were
performed or undertaken in the only jurisdiction where
subsequent remedial measures are explicitly admissible, subject to
a showing of relevancy: Rhode Island.
All of these facts make clear that the public policy underlying
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, based on the fear that corporations
will not correct product defects if those corrections could be used
against them in litigation, is simply not supported by reality. In
the one state in the union where remedial measures are explicitly
admissible, Davol chose to undertake such measures by recalling
and redesigning the CK Patch. Davol, as a Rhode Island resident
corporation, could not expect to receive protection from this
evidence in the trial court of its chosen domicile. Yet it chose to
undertake such measures, albeit too late for the thousands of
individuals adversely affected by its product. Therefore, the
prospect of having evidence of a subsequent remedial measure
used against it in court did not appear to have any effect on
Davol's corporate decision-making.
excluded from evidence is a matter of state policy."). See McInnis v. A.M.F.,
Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 246 n.8 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that "a Rule excluding
evidence of drinking is distinguishable from a 407 type Rule. While the 407
type Rule arguably reflects a substantive policy to encourage remedial
measures, a rule limiting the admissibility evidence of drinking cannot
reasonably be said to influence the behavior of potential litigants in any
way."); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 622 n.7 (8th Cir.
1983) ("Because we hold the evidence in question here admissible even under
the federal rule, we need not decide whether, if the state and the federal rules
led to different results, the state rule would control. Nevertheless, we
recognize factors which counsel respect for the state rule in this case:
jurisdiction is based on diversity, the issue is close, and the rationale behind
Rule 407 rests on public policy considerations in which the state has a strong
interest.").
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CONCLUSION
If we believe, like John Locke, that "the actions of men [are]
the best interpreters of their thoughts" then we can only conclude
that the protection afforded by Federal Rule of Evidence 407, and
its progeny throughout the state courts of this country, does
nothing to affect the actions of men - or corporations. The
somewhat tortured history of Federal Rule of Evidence 407
resulted in a provision that is inapplicable in a post-millennium
society of mass produced everything. It results in capricious and
arbitrary outcomes in a world where fungibility is often the
hallmark of the injurious products. The Davol case study,
although single and admittedly unscientific, lends strong credence
to the criticisms leveled at Federal Rule of Evidence 407. It seems
obvious that in reality, as opposed to theory, "[e]conomic self-
interest drives reasonable improvement, not an unnecessary
liability shield derivative of a rule that excludes 'evidence for
policy reasons quite apart from enabling the trier of fact to reach a
correct verdict."' 95  Stated differently, the Davol story is a
manifestation of the well trod criticism of Federal Rule 407: that
"[iut is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that [the] producer will
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effects upon its
public image, simply because evidence of... such improvement
may be admitted in an action founded on strict liability for
recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement." 96 This
admittedly individual anecdote shows that Rhode Island's Rule
407 is the better way to preserve the rights of the injured and to
measure a Defendant's conduct and liability. Rhode Island, in its
status as an outlier on this issue, creates a level playing field by
allowing evidence to come in that is not only relevant, but also
very probative without concern for an unsubstantiated corporate
public policy argument. 97 It is fairer to Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones, and
their common Defendant, all three of whom simply must establish,
or refute, the relevance of remedial measures evidence.
95. Fielding, supra note 30, at 313 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 81, at
3).
96. Ault v. Int'l Harverster Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1975).
97. Id. at 301.
